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Abstract 
Workers’ remittances have become the second largest source of net financial flows to 
developing countries. However, the main motives for sending remittances remain 
controversial. This paper examines the importance of altruistic versus investment motives 
using a new panel data set of bilateral flows from 21 Western European to 7 EU neighbouring 
countries. We find that altruism is important for remitting, as the GDP differential between 
sending and receiving countries is positively correlated with the average remittance per 
migrant. By contrast, interest rate differentials are insignificant, suggesting a weak investment 
motive. Finally, migrants’ skills raise remittances, while a large informal economy in the 
sending country depresses official remittance flows. 
 
JEL classification: D13, D64, F22, F24, O15 
 










Workers’ remittances have increased steadily over the last years. They currently represent the 
second largest source of net financial flows to developing countries, outpacing the transfers 
from official sources. While this has earned them a lot of attention at the political level, the 
main motives for remitting money remain controversial. Theoretical considerations suggest 
that remittances may be sent for investment purposes or for altruistic reasons, supporting the 
migrant’s family. 
 
This paper overcomes the main problem with understanding the issues at hand, namely the 
scarcity and inaccuracy of data. We study the determinants of workers’ remittances from 
European countries to a sample of countries in the European Neighboring Region (ENR). This 
is an area of particularly high remittance flows, as five countries in the region (Morocco, 
Egypt, Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan) were among the ten main recipients of global remittance 
flows in 2001. We construct a country-by-country dataset of bilateral remittance flows from 
21 European countries to 7 ENR countries. The dataset reflects better the amount remitted by 
migrating workers; it captures bilateral remittance flows and it incorporates information that 
has not been used in previous studies, such as income inequality and the share of the informal 
economy in the sending country. Using this dataset, we investigate altruistic and investment 
motives for remitting. 
 
We find that the difference in GDP between the host and home countries increases average 
remittances. By contrast, the effect of the interest rate differential does not appear to be 
significant. We interpret these results as an indication that altruism is important for remitting, 
while the investment motive to remit is weak at best.  
 
In addition, the empirical results suggest that average remittances per migrant increase with 
the migrants’ skill level. Moreover, the share of the informal economy tends to lower the 
average remittances per migrant. Third, and importantly for the efforts to lower remittance 
costs, we find that lower remittance costs tend to raise remittance flows if countries are 
sufficiently far apart. Finally, we do not find conclusive evidence as to whether earning 
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1.  Introduction 
Workers’ remittances have grown steadily over the past 30 years, rising at an average annual 
rate of more than 7% in nominal terms over the last decade. In contrast to net official flows 
(aid plus debt), which have stagnated if not declined, remittances have been increasing and 
have become the second largest source of net financial flows to developing countries recently. 
In 2001, remittance flows were already ten times net transfers from private sources and 
double those from official sources (Kapur 2003). Global remittances have amounted to an 
estimated 91 billion USD in 2003, when they equalled 1.6 percent of developing countries’ 
GDP or half of total inward FDI, exceeding all other private capital inflows. The World 
Bank's Global Economic Prospects 2006 report focuses particularly on migration and 
remittances. The report notes that officially recorded money sent home by migrant workers 
worldwide exceeded $232 billion in 2005. Of this, developing countries received $167 billion, 
more than twice the level of development aid from all sources. The authors suggest that 
remittances sent through informal channels could add at least 50% to the official estimate, 
making remittances the largest source of external capital in many developing countries. 
 
As a result, workers’ remittances have gained increasing interest from both researchers and 
policy makers over the last years. They are perceived as an important element for 
development in emerging economies, which prompted policy makers to encourage progress 
on understanding and facilitating remittances through formal financial systems, as well as on 
channelling a bigger remittance share to investment.
4  
 
The EU Neighbouring Region (ENR)
5 is an area of particularly high remittances flows; five 
countries in the region (Morocco, Egypt, Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan) were among the ten 
main recipients of global remittance flows in 2001 and euro area remittances to non-EU 
countries exceeded EUR 13 billion in 2003. Also for the local economies, remittances are 
important (see Table 1); they account for a large share of local GDP, ranging up to 20% in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and 23% in Jordan. Furthermore, the remittance flows for most of 
the ENR countries are considerably larger than FDI, amounting up to five times FDI inflows 
in Albania, or even 12 times in Egypt.  
 
                                                 
4 These issues have been brought up at the 2004 G-8 Sea Island Summit and the Special Summit of the 
Americas in January 2004. At the level of European Union, the Council invited the Commission in 
May 2003 to investigate the possibilities for reducing the cost and increasing the reliability of 
remittances from workers living in the EU.  
5  For the purpose of this paper, the term EU Neighbouring Region (ENR) refers to the main recipients 
of remittances in the area, i.e. the Eastern European and Mediterranean countries. 
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Table 1. Workers’ remittances in selected ENR countries
6 
Albania  Bosnia & 
Herzegovina  Bulgaria Croatia Romania  FYR of 
Macedonia  Turkey 
USD bln  0.7  1.2 0.6 1.4  1.6 0.4  3.0 
% of GDP  17.0  19.7 3.8 6.1  3.6 12.2  0.8 
% of FDI  546.9  365.9 53.6 89.8  111.0 599.1  115.7 
  
  Egypt Israel Jordan Morocco Syria Tunisia 
USD bln  2.9  4.0 2.2 3.3  0.6 1.1 
% of GDP  3.7  3.3 23.3 9.4  4.2 5.2 
% of FDI  1268.6  99.7 615.3 177.7  82.0 240.6 
Source: IMF (2005) 
 
Flows to the Maghreb, Turkey, as well as Southern and Eastern Europe originate mainly in 
the euro area. National data indicate that 82% of Morocco’s remittances stem from the euro 
area, accounting for about two-thirds of the country’s trade deficit. Central bank data also 
show that 85% of Romania’s and Tunisia’s remittance inflows are transfers from the euro 
area. This is in line with the finding that EU countries have experienced huge remittance 
outflows over the last decade, fuelled in part by intense migration from ENR countries.  
 
Despite the increased interest in workers’ remittances, relatively little work has been done to 
improve the understanding of the macroeconomic determinants of remittance flows. The main 
reasons for this are the scarcity and inaccuracy of data. Most previous work has investigated 
microeconomic determinants of remittances relying on survey data. Alternatively, researchers 
have used IMF balance of payments data to investigate macroeconomic determinants. 
However, these data have several shortcomings, in particular the high aggregation level and 
measurement issues.  
 
This paper contributes to the remittance literature in at least two ways. First, it addresses a key 
question in the remittance literature, namely whether remittances behave like capital flows or 
like altruistic transfers. To this effect, we create a new dataset containing information on 
bilateral remittance flows from 21 European countries to 7 ENR countries and investigate 
influencing factors on the average remittance per migrant. The use of bilateral migration and 
remittance – and hence, remittance per migrant – data permits to better quantify the effects of 
remittance determinants used in the literature, such as GDP and interest rate differentials 
between sending and receiving countries.  
 
Previous studies (e.g. Chami, Fullenkamp and Jahjah 2005) that looked at the effects of such 
factors have used aggregate remittance data. To our knowledge, bilateral data have not yet 
                                                 
6 The table collects countries for illustration purposes only. They do not coincide with the countries in 
the empirical sample, which are shown in Table 3 in the appendix. 
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been studied to estimate determinants of workers’ remittances. The only attempt in this spirit 
is the study by Glytsos (2002), who uses IMF data on aggregate remittance flows and assigns 
country pairs according to the main migration flows (e.g., all remittance flows to Turkey are 
assumed to stem from Germany). However, this may be misleading; our data indicate that – 
except for Algeria – remittances from one country never account for more than 50% of all 
remittance inflows into any receiving country (see Chart 4 in the Appendix).  
 
Second, the new data allow us to extend the set of candidate variables for explaining the size 
of remittance flows. In particular, we use (i) an indicator for the development of the financial 
nexus between each pair of countries, (ii) bilateral data on the stock of migrants and on the 
migrants’ skill level, (iii) a measure of income inequality and (iv) the size of the informal 
economy in the sending country as potential factors.  
 
The rest of the paper is structured in five Sections. The next Section provides an overview of 
the theoretical and empirical literature on workers’ remittances; Section 3 outlines the 
theoretical framework; Section 4 discusses our dataset and related data issues; Section 5 
presents the estimation results and a final Section concludes. 
 
2.  Literature review  
Remittances are sent due to a combination of altruistic and self-interest motives. 
Understanding these motives has been on the agenda of researchers for at least three decades; 
Rapoport and Docquier (2005) provide an excellent overview of theoretical models. On the 
one hand, it is widely acknowledged that altruism towards family members at home is an 
important motivation for remitting (Johnson and Whitelaw 1974, Lucas and Stark 1985). This 
implies a utility function in which the migrant cares about the consumption of the other 
members of the household.  
 
Self-interest motives for remitting may evolve if the family is perceived as a market in which 
members aim at entering into mutually beneficial agreements. Theories that have 
macroeconomic implications have focussed in particular on aspects of inheritance, loan 
repayment, insurance and exchange. Stark (1981a, 1981b) and Lucas and Stark (1985) view 
remittances as the result of an intergenerational contract between migrants and their parents in 
the home country. In contrast with the altruistic motive, remittances should increase in the 
family’s income and wealth if sending remittances is a way of migrants to compete for 
inheritance. 
 
Other papers (Poirine 1997, Ilahi and Jafarey 1999) have emphasised the idea of remittances 
as repayments to the family who finances migration in the first place. This suggests a U-
8
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shaped relation between the family’s pre-transfer income and remittances. Poor families are 
unable to make the investment in migration costs while wealthy families have less incentive 
to send a family member abroad to increase family income. Thus, assuming that wealthy 
families can invest more in education, remittances should first increase and then decrease in 
the migrant’s skill level. 
 
Third, the phenomenon of migration might be seen as a means of reducing risk by 
diversifying the sources of a family’s income (Stark 1991). In this framework, remittances act 
like an insurance against income shocks that might hit the recipients in the home country 
(Agarwal and Horowitz 2002, Gubert 2002). At the macroeconomic level, this implies that 
remittances will increase if output is more volatile in the recipient country.  
 
Finally, remittances may be seen in an exchange framework, where they represent a payment 
by the migrant for services provided by family members, such as taking care of her relatives 
or property (Cox 1987; Cox, Eser and Jimenez 1998). If the family’s marginal utility 
decreases in income, more remittances are required to guarantee the provision of services at 
home. Hence, a higher pre-transfer income of the family and lower unemployment at home 
would raise the amount of remittances. 
 
The empirical literature has largely focussed on the microeconomic level using survey data; 
an overview is given in Buch and Kuckulenz (2004). Another strand of literature, reviewed by 
Aydas, Neyapti, and Metin-Ozcan (2004), has investigated the macroeconomic determinants 
of remittances. We will follow this second path in an attempt to better understand how the 
macroeconomic environment affects remittance flows. 
 
Macroeconomic studies have emphasised determinants such as the level of economic activity 
in the host and the home countries, the wage rate, inflation, interest rate differentials, or the 
efficiency of the banking system (El-Sakka and McNabb 1999; Russell 1986). Wahba (1991) 
suggests that political stability and consistency in government policies and financial 
intermediation significantly affect the flow of remittances. In a sample of five Mediterranean 
countries, Faini (1994) finds evidence that the real exchange rate is also a significant 
determinant of remittances. Real earnings of workers and total number of migrants in the host 
country were consistently found to have a significant and positive effect on the flow of 
remittances (Swamy 1981; Straubhaar 1986; Elbadawi and Rocha 1992; El-Sakka and 
Mcnabb 1999; Chami, Fullenkamp and Jahjah 2005). In addition, demographic factors like 
the share of female employment or a high age-dependency ratio in the host country reduce 
remittances, while illiteracy rates affect them positively (Buch and Kuckulenz 2004). Aydas, 
Neyapti and Metin-Ozcan (2004) indicate that the black market premium, interest rate 
9
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differential, inflation rate, growth, home and host country incomes and periods of military 
regime have significantly affected Turkish remittance flows. Chami, Fullenkamp and Jahjah 
(2005) find a significant negative relation between the income gap of the recipient country 
against the US and worker remittances in percent of GDP.  
 
However, the evidence on most macroeconomic determinants is mixed. In particular, the 
influence of the interest rate differential,
7 the black market premium, domestic income and 
inflation is inconclusive.
8 In addition, Buch and Kuckulenz (2004) find that economic growth 
and the level of economic development do not have a clear impact on the magnitude of 
remittances a country receives.  
 
The main causes for inconclusive empirical results are lack of adequate data and poor data 
quality. Gathering accurate data on remittances is an extremely difficult task and the data 
usually underestimate the true remittance flows. One reason is that official statistics do not 
capture remittances sent outside the banking system. A second reason is contained in the high 
thresholds for recording; in the euro area, remittances are registered only beyond a level of 
EUR 12,500 per transfer, which goes a long way in explaining why the euro area is a net 
receiver of remittances. Third, a portion of remittance flows might include items such as 
goods imported by returning migrants or in-kind transfers, which are usually not captured in 
official statistics. To circumvent such difficulties, various studies have attempted to test the 
theoretical predictions using data for one country (or region), or one migrant group.  
 
We have collected a new dataset of bilateral remittance flows, which includes non-bank 
transfers and is not limited by reporting thresholds for several countries. While economic 
activity or the interest rate level in the sending and the recipient country may not be 
statistically significant, the difference in the respective variable between the two countries 
may matter. Our dataset permits investigating such difference effects. 
 
3.  Theoretical framework 
We present a simple two-period model that describes the behaviour of a representative 
migrant born in the home country i, and working in the host (or remittance sending) country j. 
In the first period, she maximizes her utility by allocating the income between costly transfers 
to her family in the home country, own consumption in the host country and savings. The 
                                                 
7    Swamy (1981), Straubhaar (1986), Glytsos (1988) and Elbadawi and Rocha (1992) find no 
significant relationship between remittance flows and interest rate differentials between the sending 
and receiving countries, or the variation in exchange rates. In contrast, Glytsos and Katselli (1986) 
find per capita remittances to be related to the interest rate in the sending country. El-Sakka and 
Mcnabb (1999) find that interest rate differentials negatively affect the remittances.  
8  Both Glytsos and Katselli (1986) and Elbadawi and Rocha (1992) find a negative effect of inflation, 
while El-Sakka and Mcnabb (1999) find a positive effect.  
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migrant can acquire financial/non-financial assets in both host and home country, each of 
them yielding a certain rate of return.  In the second period, the agent consumes what she 
saved in the period before. 
 
The migrant’s problem can be decomposed in two steps. First, given her earnings in the host 
country she decides how much to allocate to consumption, savings and transfers to her family. 
Second, given total savings, she solves a portfolio allocation problem, by choosing the shares 
invested in the home and the host country.  
 
The first step of the representative migrant’s problem is formalized as follows: 
 
{ } ) ( ) ( ) ( 1 2 1
0 , , , 2 1
j i i
ij
S X C C
C u C u C u U Max
ij i i γ β + + =
≥
K ,     (1) 
 
where  ] 1 , 0 ( ∈ β  is the migrant’s time discount rate,  ] 1 , 0 ( ∈ γ  the degree of altruism towards 
her family; 
i
t C  migrant’s consumption in country i at time t (t=1, 2); 
j C1  denotes the 
migrant’s family’s consumption in country j and is defined as: 
 
ij j j X I C + = 1 , 
where 
j I is the family income in country j and 
ij X  the amount that the migrant working in 
country i sends to his family. 
 
The migrant solves problem (1) subject to the following resource constraints: 
 
i ij i I S X C = + +τ 1 ,         ( 2 )  
R S C
i × = 2          ( 3 )  
 
where S is the amount saved out of the current income 
i I  that the migrant earns in country i 
and R is the overall portfolio return. The constant τ >1 can be thought of as a transfer cost. 
The sender pays τ  dollars for each dollar received by the beneficiary.  
 
Assuming logarithmic utility and denoting  S I I
i i
d − =  as the income available for own 
consumption and family transfers, the optimisation problem above can be formulated via the 
following Lagrangean: 
 
) ( ) ( ) ln( ) ( ln ) ( ln 2 1 2 1
i ij i i
d
ij j i i C R S X C I X I C C L − × + − − + + + + = µ τ λ γ β . 
 
We get the following first order conditions for 
i C1  and
ij X : 
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Using (4) and (5) in (1) we get the indirect utility as a function of S: 
 
[] {} )] ( ln[ ) ( ln ) 1 ( ) ( ln
0
S I I S I S I U Max
i j j i
ij S
− + + + + − + − =
≥
γ τγ γ β τ γ γ τ .  
 
The optimal savings 
* S is the solution of the following first-order condition: 
() S S I I I S I









+ − + −
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) 1 (
.     (6) 
 
The left hand side of (6) is an increasing function of S and the right-hand side is decreasing in 
S. Therefore, equation (6) has a unique solution  ) , 0 (
* i I S ∈ .  
 
S
* is an increasing function of τ , while the amount of remittances sent to family back home, 
ij X  is decreasing in τ . 
 
The second step of the optimization problem involves the decision regarding the portfolio 
allocation. That is, given the optimal savings amount 
* S  and the exogenous rates of return on 
assets in both countries
i R  and 
j R , the agent chooses the asset mix 
i A  and 
j A  that 








j j i i
A A
R A R A Max
j i +
≥
,         ( 7 )  
subject to 
* )] ( 1 [ S A f A A
j j i = + + ,       ( 8 )  
where  ) 1 , 0 ( , ) ( ∈ = α
α x x f  represents the cost of investing in home country assets. This 
cost is intended to capture not only the monetary costs (fees and charges of the financial 
institutions in the case of investment in financial assets) but also risks associated with 
imperfect monitoring or generally idiosyncratic risks not included in the return. For 
simplicity, the budget constraints above are expressed in terms of consumption goods in the 
sending country i. 
 
The first-order conditions with respect to 
i A  and 
j A  are: 
) (
i A   0 , 0 ≥ ≤ −
i i A R λ  with complementary slackness; 
) (
j A   () ( ) 0 , 0 ) 1 ( 1 ≥ ≤ + + −
j j j A A R
α
α λ  with complementary slackness. 
 
It can be seen that  0 =
j A  when 
j i R R > = λ  and  0 =
i A  when 
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S A .    (9) 
 
Consequently, the total amount of remittances the representative migrant sends from country i 
to country j is: 
) , ( ) , , (
− + − − +
+ = + =
i j j j i ij j ij
ij R R A I I X A X REM τ .    (10) 
 
Based on the above equilibrium relationship, we estimate the following remittance function: 
 






ijt R R I I f REM − − = ,      ( 1 1 )  
 
where REM are remittances per migrant, subscripts i and j indicate the receiving and sending 
country respectively and t is a time subscript. The first argument denotes the difference 
between real incomes of the migrant and her family back home, according to equation (4). 
The second terms denote the rate of return differential for financial and possibly non-financial 
assets (real-estate) as given by the linearised version of equation (9). The effect of the income 
differential on the remittance flow will capture the altruistic motive to remit, while the effect 
of the two rates of return reflects the importance of self-interest behind the decision to remit. 
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The final term is the cost of sending remittances between two countries. 
 
Since empirical evidence indicates a lot of variation of migrants’ skill composition across 
countries,
9 we augment this framework by accounting for the skill level of migrants and a 
measure of income inequality in the sending country. Low-skilled migrants tend to make up 
the bottom of the income distribution in the host country, so a higher income inequality will 
depress their earnings and thereby, the amount remitted.  
 
4.  Data issues and methodology 
As discussed in Appendix 1, balance of payment data are likely to underestimate the true 
remittance flows due to high recording thresholds and transfers through informal channels, 
such as hawala
10, cash carried by friends and relatives, and in-kind remittances. In addition, 
bilateral remittance flows are not recorded and as a consequence, only aggregate figures have 
been used in empirical research. 
 
Harrison et al. (2004) is the only attempt to estimate bilateral remittance flows between 57 
countries and 18 geographic regions. They use IMF balance of payments data to compute the 
average remittance inflow into a country per national abroad. Multiplying by the number of 
migrants from the home country to the host country gives the remittance inflow from the host 
country to the home country. While this procedure may give an idea of the bilateral flows, it 
assumes that the migrants coming from the home country but working in different countries 
have the same saving decision rule and remit the same amount. This is not very likely, as 
remittances are likely to be positively correlated with disposable income. Indeed, our country-
by-country data confirm this presumption. Chart 1 shows for the example of Croatia a 
positive relationship between average remittance per migrant and the GDP per capita ratio 
between sending country and Croatia.  
 
                                                 
9 OECD (2002) International Migration data indicate that the fraction of migrants with less than upper 
secondary education varies between 8% and 81% for the remittance sending countries in our sample.  
10 Hawala is a wide-spread informal remittance system. The worker transfers a sum in foreign currency 
to an agent overseas under the agreement that the local currency equivalent determined at an agreed 
exchange rate (which is usually set above the official exchange rate) is transferred by the agent's 
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GDP per capita ratio between sending country and Croatia (in logs)
 
Sources: See Table 4 in the Appendix. 
 
We collected bilateral remittance data from 19 EU countries, Norway and Switzerland to nine 
receiving ENR countries. The data are observed annually over the period 2000–2005, but not 
all countries have data for all periods. Table 4 in the Appendix gives the sources and 
definitions for remittance flow data, as well as data sources for the other variables used in the 
regressions. 
 
The remittance data were then matched with migration data from OECD (2002), resulting in a 
dataset of 97 pairs, a total of 264 observations. Table 3 in the Appendix shows the European 
sending countries, the ENR receiving countries and the observed periods. For the estimation, 
we excluded Romania and Russia, for which only one year of data was available. 
 
Chart 4 in the Appendix gives a breakdown of bilateral remittance flows by receiving country 
in the sample for the last year available for each country. It turns out that in the Maghreb 
countries, remittance flows predominantly originate in France. Germany is the largest source 
of remittance flows to Eastern Europe and Russia, while Ireland is also quite important as a 
source of remittances for the former Yugoslav republics.  
 
Table 2 in the Appendix provides summary statistics for the variables used in the empirical 
part. The dependent variable is the log of remittances per migrant from country i to country j, 
obtained by dividing the log of remittances from i to j by the migrant stock from country j 
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Rate of return for financial assets. The rate of return differential for financial assets is proxied 
by the real short-term deposit rate differential between sending and receiving countries. This 
permits us to take into account inflation in both countries. A larger real interest rate 
differential should attract more remittance inflows if migrants consider their home market less 
risky than the general market. However, given that the deposit rate refers to local currency 
deposits, interest rate differentials reflect both risk perceptions and expected exchange rate 
movements. Since in particular Eastern European countries have experienced a “convergence 
play” during the observation period, a low interest rate differential may reflect market 
expectations of an exchange rate appreciation. If this effect dominates the effect of the risk 
profile, the effect of the interest rate differential on remittance flows may well be negative.  
 
Income differential. The ratio of GDP per capita in USD at purchasing power parities is used 
as a proxy for the income differential between sending and receiving countries. This contrasts 
with previous studies, which have used GDP in USD at nominal exchange rates. First, our 
measure accounts for non-tradables, thereby avoiding inflating the income gap. Second, the 
variable captures the fact that the migrant makes his decision based on the goods and services 
that the transferred amount of money can buy for his family at home. It is worth noting that 
the income differential may also partly account for investment motives, assuming that poorer 
countries should grow faster and therefore have higher returns. However, unless there are 
considerable market distortions, such an effect would be fully captured by the interest rate 
differential.  
 
Migration. Data on bilateral migrant stocks for each country pair have been collected from the 
OECD database for the last year available (2001 or 2002). Yearly country-by-country data on 
migrants’ stock are available only for few country pairs in the sample. However, variations 
over time should not be a reason for concern, as the pattern of these data suggests that the 
migrant stock does not change dramatically over time. 
 
Skill level. The OECD database also contains information about the skill levels of migrants. 
Since income is strongly correlated with human capital, this suggests a negative relationship 
between remittances and the fraction of unskilled people (defined to include those with less 
than upper secondary education) in the total stock of migrants. Chart 2 seems to support this 
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Fraction of unskilled workers (in logs)
 
Sources: See Table 4 in the Appendix. 
 
As an alternative measure of unskilled workers, we include the fraction of medium skilled 
migrants (those with upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary education). Broadening 
the scope of the unskilled group appears to be warranted on at least two accounts. First, the 
quality of education may be expected to be higher in the host OECD countries than the home 
countries at every education level. Second, migration is generally associated with a loss in the 
skill level since human capital is country specific. Moreover, migrants frequently accept jobs 
for which they are overqualified, earning wages corresponding to a lower skill level. 
 
Income inequality. Higher income inequality in the sending country might reduce the 
migrant’s wage income and thereby, the amount remitted. As this is particularly true for low 
skilled people, they are more likely to migrate to countries with low earnings inequality.
11 
This will attenuate the negative effect of skill on migrant’s wage and thereby, on the amount 
she remits. The effect of income inequality on average remittances depends on the shares of 
skilled and unskilled migrants and the strength of the selection bias. We use the Gini 
coefficient for the last available year as a measure of income inequality.  
 
Remittance cost. Orozco (2002) finds that costs vary widely between countries and among 
institutions involved in the transfer, reflecting the level of involvement of the banking 
industry and other businesses and the extent of government involvement to reduce transfer 
                                                 
11 This is called Borjas’s negative-selection hypothesis, and has been validated with data from the 1990 
and 2000 Mexican and U.S. population censuses (Chiquiar and Hanson 2005).  
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costs. Neither costs of sending money through different institutions nor the precise channels 
of transfers are known.
12 Wahba (2005) uses bank deposits per GDP in the receiving countries 
as a proxy for financial development.  
 
As many transfers are not made through banks, and as we need a bilateral measure for 
remittance costs, we construct a measure of financial linkage between two countries. 
Multiplying the number of Western Union agents per million people in the sending and 
receiving countries gives the number of possible links between each country pair. This proxy 
captures the availability of remittance services in both sending and receiving countries, i.e. the 
shoe-leather costs of remitting. In addition, this variable captures the degree of competition on 
the market for money-sending services, even for countries where banks have the largest 
market share. The presence of a tight network of money-transfer agents in the market is likely 
to induce banks to offer similar services in terms of costs and procedures.
13 Financial services 
are more likely to be used for remitting if high travel costs prevent unofficial money transfers. 
Therefore, we create an interaction term between the financial linkage and a dummy that 
assumes the value zero if two countries share a common border and one otherwise. 
 
Unofficial economic activity. As discussed above, a considerable share of remittances is 
transferred by informal means, especially from countries that experienced massive illegal 
migration. Such transfers will not be measured in our data. To account for this, we control for 
the level of unofficial activity in the sending countries. A larger share of unofficial activity 
raises the chance that official migrants participate in it and remit the related income through 
non-official channels. Hence we expect a negative sign for this variable. 
 
Rate of return on real estate. A natural proxy for the return differential on non-financial assets 
would be the difference in house prices, as real estate investment is an important reason for 
remitting. Anecdotal evidence suggests that house prices in Romania soar in summer due to 
the temporary return of migrant workers, pushing up real estate demand. Survey data from 
Egypt indicate that 54% of remittances are spent on housing and land (Orozco 2002). 
Unfortunately, reliable data on house prices are not available for ENR countries. Moreover, 
the existing data on residential property prices for European countries do not allow price level 
comparison between countries. Finally, prices are not adjusted for quality indicators, such as 
age, location, or number of bathrooms.
14 A potential solution would be rent data but such data 
                                                 
12 For example, at least 60% of remittances to Morocco were sent through Groupe Banques Populaires, 
a majority state-owned bank with an extensive network of branches in Morocco and in Europe 
(Orozco 2002). In other regions, the most important players appear to be money transfer agencies.  
13 A difficulty with this variable is reverse causality, as money transfer agencies will move to regions 
with high remittance activity. Hence, the coefficient may also capture the effect of remittances on the 
development of a banking network.  
14 We thank Martin Eiglsperger for pointing this out.  
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are not useful for countries with rent controls. For example, relative rent costs for an 
unfurnished two-bedroom residential apartment in the capital cities of 16 sending countries 
and Bucharest are uncorrelated with average remittances to Romania in the first quarter of 
2005 (Chart 3).
15 This leaves the question whether they are a bad proxy for house prices or 
whether house price differentials are orthogonal to remittance flows. 
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Sources: See Table 4 in the Appendix.  
 
5.  Estimation results 
We estimate the relation between the variables discussed above and workers’ remittances 
using an unbalanced panel estimator. To account for unobservable variation across individuals 
and time periods, we include time dummies and a dummy for each receiving country. Table 5 
in the Appendix presents the estimation results. We also run different combinations of 
explanatory variables in order to check for robustness across specifications. 
 
The baseline case in column one shows that the income differential has a strong positive 
impact on the average remittances per migrant, indicating that on average, people remit more 
the poorer the receiving country is relative to the sending country. This is in line with theories 
suggesting altruistic motives for remitting. By contrast, the real interest rate differential does 
not have a significant effect. In combination, these two results suggest that the decision to 
remit is driven more by altruistic reasons rather than investment motives. We checked for the 
robustness of this important result by re-estimating the equation as a panel with fixed or 
random effects for country pairs. The results were extremely robust to these changes.  
 
                                                 
15 Data are extracted from EIU City Data.  
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Columns 2 to 6 include the fraction of unskilled migrants on the right hand side of the 
regression. The share of unskilled migrants in a country reduces the average amount of 
remittances, indicating that unskilled migrants have fewer funds at their disposal from which 
to remit. In addition, unskilled workers prefer countries with a lower earnings inequality.  
 
As discussed in Section 4, we use two measures of the share of unskilled workers in the 
migrant population. Columns 7 to 11 report the estimates for the share of low and medium 
skilled workers, as opposed to the share of low skilled workers. 
 
The average remittance is a weighted average of the amounts sent by skilled and unskilled 
workers, i.e. it depends on the share of low skilled workers but also on the income distribution 
over the migrant population. We consider this aspect by including the Gini coefficient as a 
measure of income inequality in the remittance sending country. Increased inequality will 
affect both the migration composition and the amounts each group can send. On the one hand, 
skilled workers in more unequal countries will tend to earn more than their counterparts in 
countries with a more equal income distribution. This will boost the average remittance. On 
the other hand, the unskilled workers that do come will be paid less than in more equal 
countries, depressing the average remittance. The absolute skill proportion conditional on the 
income inequality level determines which one of the two effects is the dominating force.  
 
While we find that a higher share of unskilled labour reduces the average remittance 
irrespective of the measure used, the sign of income inequality switches. Higher income 
inequality raises the average remittance if we only account for the share of low skilled 
workers in the migrant population, i.e. using the narrow measure of unskilled workers. It 
depresses the average remittance if we consider both low and medium skilled labour. Note 
that the effect of income inequality is significant across all specifications.  
 
As discussed above, the narrow measure may underestimate the true proportion of migrants 
earning low wages we consider the broad measure of unskilled labour more appropriate as the 
educational level is generally higher in remitting countries. In addition, migration often 
involves a loss in specific knowledge and medium skilled workers are likely to accept lower-
paid jobs. It turns out that with this measure, the share of low skilled workers is even more 
important than in the other case. Finally, the R squared rises by 0.12 across all specifications. 
We conclude that remittances from countries with a higher share of low skilled immigrants 
tend to be lower. This is an important result since existing evidence on the relationship 
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between remittances and migrants’ skill composition is very limited.
16 At the same time, the 
evidence on the effect of income inequality in the sending country is inconclusive.  
 
As another proxy for migrants’ income we experimented with the sending country GDP 
(migrants should earn more if the average income is higher).
17 However, as this variable is 
positively correlated with the income differential, the effects of both variables were 
insignificant when including both. When we only included GDP in the sending country, the 
effect was significantly positive, without affecting any of the other results. This supports our 
finding that higher average income raises the average amount remitted. 
 
Our set-up also allows us to consider remittance costs between pairs of countries. Remittance 
costs as proxied by the density of the remission network do not affect the amount of money 
remitted significantly. In fact, a tighter network seems to depress the amount of remittances 
(insignificantly). This may seem surprising but has a straightforward explanation: unofficial 
transfers are particularly easy in countries with common borders. Remittances are more likely 
to be effected through institutional channels if travelling is more difficult. Consequently, we 
find that the financial nexus has a positive effect on the amount of remittances if there is no 
common border between sending and receiving countries. This effect is significantly positive 
in all regressions, suggesting that the financial linkage has a positive impact on remittances if 
the distance between countries is sufficiently big. In fact, previous literature has 
acknowledged the importance of the financial system for remittances but has not found any 
significant effect in empirical work.  
 
Finally, we also consider the effect of measurement errors by incorporating the magnitude of 
the unofficial economy in the host country. If unofficial work is linked with unofficial 
remittances, this should depress the total amount of officially recorded remittances. We do 
find that a larger share of unofficial activity in the economy lowers the amount of (official) 
remittances per migrant. This appears to indicate that, as the general level of informal activity 
rises migrants are more involved in it, just as anyone else.  
 
6.  Conclusion 
The paper looks at the determinants of workers’ remittances from Western European 
countries to a sample of countries in the ENR region. We construct a country-by-country 
                                                 
16 Faini (2002) regresses the ratio of remittances to GDP (or to the home country population) on a set of 
variables that includes the stock of migrants and the skilled composition of migration. 
Counterintuitively, he finds that remittances decline as the share of migrants with a tertiary education 
goes up. However, this result should be taken with caution, as the number of observations in his dataset 
is very small (33 and 38, respectively).  
17 We would like to thank the anonymous referee for suggesting this. 
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dataset that incorporates non-bank transfers and remittances in small amounts and therefore 
better reflects the amount remitted by migrating workers. The dataset gives figures for 
bilateral remittance flows, which allows us to consider various aspects of remittances that 
previous studies were unable to tackle. Precisely, the data permit controlling for GDP 
differences between sending and receiving country, the difference in returns to financial 
assets in the two countries and costs of remittances, proxied by the size of the financial 
network between two countries. In addition, the dataset incorporates information that has not 
been used in previous studies, including migrants’ skill level, income inequality and the share 
of the informal economy in the sending country.  
 
We find that the difference in GDP between the host and home countries increases 
remittances, which we interpret as an indication that altruism is important for remitting. By 
contrast, the interest rate differential between the countries is insignificant, i.e. the investment 
motive to remit is weak at best. These results add to a growing literature on the main reasons 
for remitting. The message from our data is clearly that migrants (at least in our sample) remit 
for altruistic reasons, not for investment purposes. 
 
We also find that average remittances per migrant increase with the migrants’ skill level. 
Moreover, our results suggest that earning inequality in the host country is more likely to 
lower average remittances but this effect may also be the opposite if a narrower measure of 
low-skilled workers is used. The share of the informal economy tends to lower the average 
remittances per migrant. 
 
Finally, and most important for the efforts to lower remittance costs, we find that lower 
remittance costs tend to raise remittance flows if countries are sufficiently far apart. 
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Appendix 1. Measuring remittances 
 
The IMF’s balance of payments is the principal source of aggregate remittance data. 
However, the officially recorded remittance flows published in the recipient countries´ 
balance of payments usually underestimate the actual level of remittances. This is due to 
imprecise either to the accounting methods used (that might lead to imprecise measures of 
remittances), or to the existence of informal channels for transferring remittance. 
 
The definition of remittance flows depends on the items from the balance of payments that are 
considered. The narrow definition includes only “workers’ remittances” and covers amounts 
sent by people residing for more than a year in the sending country.  
 
A broader definition includes the amounts sent by temporary workers or “compensation of 
employees”. The IMF definition of a temporary worker (adopted recently by the World Bank, 
2003) is a person that works abroad for less than a year and covers border and seasonal 
workers. However, the broader definition has some problems that are indicated by Kapur 
(2003). One of them is the practical difficulty of distinguishing between the workers that earn 
what is called “compensation of employees” and the actual migrants who reside in the 
sending country. Second, “compensation of employees” includes amounts paid by employers 
such as insurance, social security or payments to pension funds. The existence of these 
transfers is likely to overstate the true remittance flows to the recipient country.  
 
Moreover, there are substantial flows of remittances crossing borders that go unrecorded. 
They include the in-kind transfers and the funds sent through the capital account by overseas 
residents, such as special savings accounts, which are then withdrawn in local currency. Puri 
and Ritzema (1999) point out that there are remittance flows which are a portion of funds that 
migrants bring home in the form of cash or traveller's cheques and convert them into local 
currency at domestic banks. This clearly leads to an understatement of migrant remittances as 
foreign currency converted into local currency is recorded as tourist expenditure in the 
balance of payments accounts. 
 
Another data limitation stems from the different methods for measuring remittances across 
countries. Therefore, it is unclear whether the reported data are comparable. For example, 
Timmermann (1997) finds that Portuguese data suggest that remittances are four times higher 
than German data indicate. A key point is the fact that usually the thresholds for recording 
remittances are very high, like the €12,500 threshold for the Euro zone since the introduction 
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The immediate consequence is that balance of payments data fail to capture the transfers 
made by low-income migrants, who usually account for the bulk of remitters. This probably 
explains why the euro area runs a surplus concerning workers’ remittances. Euro area workers 
abroad are more likely to remit larger sums of money than migrants from poorer countries 
working in the euro area. Accordingly, remittance outflows from the euro area go largely 
unrecorded (i.e. any transfer of less than €12,500). Moreover, a majority of receiving 
countries have incomplete data for several years over the last two decades, making it difficult 
to do rigorous analysis. Recently, efforts to improve the recording procedures have been 
intensified, spearheaded by the World Bank.  
 
In addition, a considerable volume of remittances is transferred through informal channels. 
The use of the informal means is encouraged by practical difficulties and the costs of sending 
money to developing countries. There is evidence that unrecorded remittances are likely to be 
quite significant, particularly for low-income migrants. The flow of unrecorded remittances is 
likely to be positively correlated with the magnitude of illegal migration. Illegal migrants tend 
to be frequent remitters to their native country and are more likely to use informal transfer 
channels. This aspect is particularly important for the euro area as some countries experienced 
massive illegal migration from ENR countries. 
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Appendix 2 – Additional charts and tables 
 
Table 2: Summary statistics 
Variable Mean  Std.  dev  Min  Max 
Remittances (mn USD)  78.8  217.9  0.0  1606.9 
Log(remittances)/migrant -6.16  1.41  -11.55  -1.11 
Stock of migrants  47984.4  143756.9  12  1210557.0 
Fraction of low skilled people in 
total migrants (%) 
42.0 18.8  7.6 81.0 
Fraction of low and medium 
skilled people in total migrants (%) 
78.1 14.2  33.0  100.0 
Real deposit rate, sending  0.96  1.71  -3.59  6.34 
Real deposit rate, receiving  1.38  4.00  -7.09  9.70 
GDP per capita USD PPP, 
sending 
26131.2 8875.1  10060.5  63608.6 
GDP per capita USD PPP, 
Receiving 
7359.6 2552.3  3483.2  11568.0 
Number of Western Union agents, 
sending  
2843.6 2863.8  3.0 9780.0 
Number of Western Union agents, 
receiving  
1268.5 684.4  49.0  4026.0 
Gini coefficient, sending  28.4  3.8  22.0  37.0 
Unofficial economic activity (% of 
GDP) 
18.0 4.8  10.2  30.7 
 
Notes: Sending countries: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak 
Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom. Receiving countries: Algeria, Egypt, 
Morocco, Tunisia, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia & Montenegro, Romania, Russian Federation. Estimates 
on unofficial economic activity are not available for Luxembourg. 
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Table 3: Countries and pe
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Table 4: Description and sources of data 
Remittances  Tunisia – Central Bank of Tunisia balance of payments 2003 
publication (includes cash, in-kind transfers) 
Morroco - Office des changes (banking transfers, postal transfers, 
cash) 
Algeria - Central Bank of Algeria 
Egypt - Central Bank of Egypt, (transfers via banks and other 
agencies, remittances in cash only, no thresholds for recording) 
Serbia - Central Bank of Serbia 
Montenegro – Central Bank of Montenegro (data collected through 
International Transactions Reporting System, includes compensations 
of employees who have worked abroad for less than a year, the 
amounts the employees, who have worked abroad for more than a 
year, have sent, and pensions) 
Croatia – Central Bank of Croatia, bank reports 
Macedonia – Central Bank of Macedonia, reports from deposit-
money banks 
Russian Federation – Central Bank of Russia Remittances of 
Individuals to the Russian Federation via Money Transfer Systems 
and Post Offices 
Romania - Romanian Central Bank - Bank reports for January-April 
2005 
GDP per capita USD 
PPP 
World Economic Outlook (IMF) 
Stock of migrants  OECD, International Migration Data, Stock of foreign born 
population by country of birth 
Fraction of 
low/medium skilled 
migrants in total 
migrant population 
OECD, International Migration Data 
Stock of foreign born people with less than upper secondary education 
Stock of foreign born people with upper secondary and post-
secondary non-tertiary  
Real interest rates  Inflation and deposit rate data for Serbia & Montenegro: National 
Bank of Serbia (Weighted Deposit Rates of Commercial Banks for 
households)  
Inflation and deposit rate data for Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
Slovak Republic, and all other receiving countries: IMF International 
Financial Statistics 
All other sending countries: IMF World Economic Outlook (annual, 
real short-term deposit rate) 
Number of Western 
Union agents in 
sending and 
receiving countries 
Western Union website 
Gini coefficients for 
sending countries 
World Income Inequality Database V 2.0a June 2005 
http://www.wider.unu.edu/wiid/wiid.htm 
Unofficial economic 
activity as % of 
GDP, sending 
countries 
"Dodging the Grabbing Hand: The Determinants of Unofficial 
Activity in 69 Countries" by E. Friedman, S. Johnson, D. Kaufmann, 
and P. Zoido-Lobatón, Journal of Public Economics, June 2000 
http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/ 
No data available for Luxembourg   32
ECB































































































(fraction of low skilled 



































































































































































































































































































































































Working Paper Series No 688
October 2006
European Central Bank Working Paper Series
For a complete list of Working Papers published by the ECB, please visit the ECB’s website
(http://www.ecb.int)
651 “On the determinants of external imbalances and net international portfolio flows: a global
perspective” by R. A. De Santis and M. Lührmann, July 2006.
652 “Consumer price adjustment under the microscope: Germany in a period of low inflation” by
J. Hoffmann and J.-R. Kurz-Kim, July 2006.
653 “Acquisition versus greenfield: the impact of the mode of foreign bank entry on information and
bank lending rates” by S. Claeys and C. Hainz, July 2006.
654 “The German block of the ESCB multi-country model” by I. Vetlov and T. Warmedinger,
July 2006.
655 “Fiscal and monetary policy in the enlarged European Union” by S. Pogorelec, July 2006.
656 “Public debt and long-term interest rates: the case of Germany, Italy and the USA” by P. Paesani,
R. Strauch and M. Kremer, July 2006.
657 “The impact of ECB monetary policy decisions and communication on the yield curve” by
C. Brand, D. Buncic and J. Turunen, July 2006.
658 “The response of firms‘ investment and financing to adverse cash flow shocks: the role of bank
relationships” by C. Fuss and P. Vermeulen, July 2006.
659 “Monetary policy rules in the pre-EMU era: Is there a common rule?” by M. Eleftheriou,
D. Gerdesmeier and B. Roffia, July 2006.
660 “The Italian block of the ESCB multi-country model” by E. Angelini, A. D’Agostino and
P. McAdam, July 2006.
661 “Fiscal policy in a monetary economy with capital and finite lifetime” by B. Annicchiarico,
N. Giammarioli and A. Piergallini, July 2006.
662 “Cross-border bank contagion in Europe” by R. Gropp, M. Lo Duca and J. Vesala, July 2006.
663
664 “Fiscal convergence before entering the EMU” by L. Onorante, July 2006.
665 “The euro as invoicing currency in international trade” by A. Kamps, August 2006.
666 “Quantifying the impact of structural reforms” by E. Ernst, G. Gong, W. Semmler and
L. Bukeviciute, August 2006.
667 “The behaviour of the real exchange rate: evidence from regression quantiles” by K. Nikolaou,
August 2006.
668 “Declining valuations and equilibrium bidding in central bank refinancing operations” by
C. Ewerhart, N. Cassola and N. Valla, August 2006.
669 “Regular adjustment: theory and evidence” by J. D. Konieczny and F. Rumler, August 2006.
“Monetary conservatism and fiscal policy” by K. Adam and R. M. Billi, July 2006.34
ECB
Working Paper Series No 688
October 2006
670 “The importance of being mature: the effect of demographic maturation on global per-capita
GDP” by R. Gómez and P. Hernández de Cos, August 2006.
671 “Business cycle synchronisation in East Asia” by F. Moneta and R. Rüffer, August 2006.
672 “Understanding inflation persistence: a comparison of different models” by H. Dixon and E. Kara,
September 2006.
673 “Optimal monetary policy in the generalized Taylor economy” by E. Kara, September 2006.
674 “A quasi maximum likelihood approach for large approximate dynamic factor models” by C. Doz,
D. Giannone and L. Reichlin, September 2006.
675 “Expansionary fiscal consolidations in Europe: new evidence” by A. Afonso, September 2006.
676 “The distribution of contract durations across firms: a unified framework for understanding and
comparing dynamic wage and price setting models” by H. Dixon, September 2006.
677 “What drives EU banks’ stock returns? Bank-level evidence using the dynamic dividend-discount
model” by O. Castrén, T. Fitzpatrick and M. Sydow, September 2006.
678 “The geography of international portfolio flows, international CAPM and the role of monetary
policy frameworks” by R. A. De Santis, September 2006.
679 “Monetary policy in the media” by H. Berger, M. Ehrmann and M. Fratzscher, September 2006.
680
D. Giannone, October 2006.
681 “Regional inflation dynamics within and across euro area countries and a comparison with the US”
by G. W. Beck, K. Hubrich and M. Marcellino, October 2006.
682  “Is reversion to PPP in euro exchange rates non-linear?” by B. Schnatz, October 2006.
683 “Financial integration of new EU Member States” by L. Cappiello, B. Gérard, A. Kadareja and
S. Manganelli, October 2006.
684 “Inflation dynamics and regime shifts” by J. Lendvai, October 2006.
685 “Home bias in global bond and equity markets: the role of real exchange rate volatility”
by M. Fidora, M. Fratzscher and C. Thimann, October 2006
686 “Stale information, shocks and volatility” by R. Gropp and A. Kadareja, October 2006.
687 “Credit growth in Central and Eastern Europe: new (over)shooting stars?”
by B. Égert, P. Backé and T. Zumer, October 2006.
688 “Determinants of workers’ remittances: evidence from the European Neighbouring Region”
by I. Schiopu and N. Siegfried, October 2006.
“Comparing alternative predictors based on large-panel factor models” by A. D’Agostino andISSN 1561081-0
9 771561 081005